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Abstract. Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) has been widely ad-
opted for object identification. An RFID system comprises three essential
components, namely RFID tags, readers and a backend server. Conven-
tionally, the system is considered to be controlled by a single party who
maintains all the secret information. However, in some practical scenar-
ios, RFID tags, readers and servers could be operated by different par-
ties. Although the private information should not be shared, the system
should allow a valid tag to be authenticated by a legal reader. The chal-
lenge in designing the system is preserving the tag and reader’s privacy.
In this paper, we propose a novel concept of authorized RFID authen-
tication. The proposed protocols allow the tag to be merely identifiable
by an authorized reader and the server cannot reveal the tag during the
reader-server interaction. We provide a formal definition of privacy and
security models of authorized authentication protocols under the strong
and weak notions and propose three provably secure protocols.
1 Introduction
A Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) system comprises three components:
RFID tags, RFID readers and a backend server. An RFID tag is associated with
a unique identifier which is allocated by the backend server. The typical RFID
system is established by a single party who initiates the secret keys. To identify
a tag, a reader communicates with the tag and sends the tag’s response to the
backend server. The server checks the tag’s identity by using the shared keys
and informs the reader whether the tag is valid.
Many RFID authentication protocols [24, 25, 15, 14] have been proposed to
preserve the tag privacy in conventional systems. These protocols assume that
a reader and a server are held by a single entity. However, in some practical
? This work is supported by the Australian Research Council Discovery Project
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scenarios, we found that tag, reader and server are relatively independent, and
hence, the existing solutions of RFID authentication protocols are deemed to be
impractical. Consider the following scenario.
In an priviledged membership club, there are sole facilities provided for their
members exclusively, such as restaurant, massage and sauna. Each of these fa-
cilities is operated by different business owners, who are paid by the owner of
the club, who is also taking membership fees from its members. Hence, these
facilities will allow exclusive club members only to access them and enjoy the
service provided. In order to provide this benefit to the members, the club issues
a membership card that is used to identify each member’s identity. Neverthe-
less, to ensure the privacy of each member, the member would like to ensure that
his/her identity will remain private whenever he/she is enjoying those services.
Otherwise, these facilities will not be attractive to the members, if they have to
sacrifice their privacy to trade for the facilities offered. In addition, the facilities
are also expected to prevent the sensitive customer information from being ex-
posed to the club, even though the members are indeed paying the membership
fee to the club. The current solution may sound feasible to be implemented with
an RFID system. Nevertheless, the requirement to maintain both privacy and
accountability at the same time is seemingly contradictory.
The challenge in designing authentication protocols for the above scenario is
the tag and reader’s privacy. A strong tag privacy prevents a tag being linked
in two different sessions even if the tag is completely corrupted. Most previous
protocols consider the tag untraceability under the assumption that the server
is honest and the reader can authenticate all the tags. However, it is suitable to
our scenario where the server and the reader are relatively independent. The ad-
versary who plays as an authorized reader can attempt to disclose a tag which is
not intended to be identifiable. The reader’s privacy is considered as whether the
backend server can reveal the tag’s identity during the protocol run. Specifically,
the tag is merely identifiable by the authorized reader rather than the server;
otherwise the server can obtain the merchant’s (reader) client information and
trace the tag. Unfortunately, to the best of our knowledge, existing protocols
ignore this requirement and there is no protocol that cater the reader’s privacy.
Therefore, we need new models to evaluate a protocol’s privacy and a novel
protocol is desired.
Tag impersonation is one of crucial security problems of authentication proto-
cols. Normally, it is hard to resist this attack if the tag is compromised. However,
in our system, the untrusted server can cheat the reader without corrupting the
tag by using the tag’s shared secret. Hence, the protocol needs to prevent abuse
of the shared information by the server.
Our Contributions. We introduce a novel notion of authorized RFID authen-
tication (ARA, for short) protocols. In an ARA protocol, a reader is required
to be authorized prior to identifying a tag and the server is blind regarding the
tag which is being identified. The exiting protocols allow the server to disclose
the tag’s identity, which is not desirable for systems which require strong pri-
vacy protection. In this paper, provide three constructions. First, we propose a
concrete construction based on the symmetric key cryptography. The protocol
provides a weak privacy while the tag only needs to perform hash computations.
To improve the privacy, we provide two protocols which achieve the strong pri-
vacy. The second protocol provides constant authentication time on the reader,
while the communication cost is dependent on the number of authorized tags.
The third protocol supports the constant communication cost, while it requires
exhaustive key search.
We discuss the privacy and security requirements of ARA protocols. Firstly,
a reader is only allowed to authenticate a specified group of tags which are cur-
rently authorized. It indicates the tag’s forward privacy and backward privacy.
These two notions are different from the traditional definitions. We give the def-
inition in Section 4.2. Then, the security of a tag is considered such that the
server cannot forge a tag unless it corrupts the tag. According to the proposed
threat model, the privacy and security models are classified in strong and weak.
We prove that our proposed ARA protocols are secure.
Related Work. Vaudenay [27] proposed a strong privacy model which is con-
sidered as the most complete one. The privacy of an RFID tag authentication
protocol is classified in several levels which are strong, destructive, forward and
weak. Each level is with respect to a different adversary with a set of oracle calls.
A strong adversary is allowed to corrupt a tag and continues future interactions
with the compromised tag.
Another strong privacy model was introduced by Juels and Weis [16]. The
model is based on the IND-CCA experiment and the adversary of the experiment
aims to distinguish two different tags. Later, Hermans, Pashalidis, Vercautern
and Preneel [13] proposed a new practical RFID privacy model. They defined
the “left” and “right” world that an adversary needs to decide which world is
simulated in the experiment. Many other RFID privacy models (e.g., [7, 6, 21,
8]) are also presented in the literature.
Nithyanand, Tsudik and Uzun [22, 23] considered the reader revocation prob-
lem in the public key infrastructure based RFID system. This problem is promi-
nent as the (passive) tag could not check the time information during the protocol
execution. The proposed solution requires a tag to equip a date display and a
user checks during the certificate verification.
The elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) based RFID authentication proto-
cols are acceptable by low-cost RFID tags [12, 20]. Many ECC based RFID
authentication protocols [26, 17–19, 2] were proposed. The main purpose of the
ECC based protocol is to provide the strong privacy. However, most of existing
schemes have been unfortunately broken later in [11, 17, 9, 10, 5].
2 System Model
In this section, we describe the entities of the ARA system and the formal
definition of ARA protocols. The system defines the following entities: Tags,
Readers and Servers.
– Tag Ti: Has a small storage and is not temper-resistant. It stores the keys in a
non-volatile memory and requires capabilities to perform hash computations
and ECC computations depends on the protocols. It can be considered as a
membership card held by the member who initiates the tag’s secret key.
– Reader Ri: A powerful device which is authorized by a server to authenti-
cate a group of tags with the given period key. Ri is controlled by a merchant
who has an individual backend server.
– Server Si: Si provides the membership registration for customers and aids
the reader to authenticate a tag. The server can authorize the reader to
authenticate a group of tags and revoke the reader when it is no longer
qualified.
The ARA protocol is executed by tag, reader and server. In the system, a
server creates a tag and publishes a set of public information, such as the public
key of the server. The member initiates the tag with the server’s information
and the keys which are chosen by himself. The public key of the tag is given to
the server when the card is activated, while the private key is unknown to the
server. To authorize a reader, the server generates a period key for the reader.
During the tag authentication, the reader needs to cooperate with the server.
However, the server cannot discover the identity of the tag which is involved in
the session. To revoke a reader, the server can let the reader’s period key be
expired.
Our protocol consists of four algorithms: server key generation (ServerKey-
Gen), tag key generation (TagKeyGen), reader authorization (ReaderAuth) and
tag authentication (Auth). The definition of algorithms are depicted as follows.
– ServerKeyGen(k) → (PK,SK): Taking as input a security parameter k, it
generates the server’s public/private key pair (PK,SK).
– TagKeyGen(T, k)→ (pk, sk): Taking as input a security parameter k for the
tag T , it outputs T ’s public key pk and private key sk.
– ReaderAuth({pki},TR, sk,R) → (rsk, rpk): Taking as input a set of public
keys {pki} of tags TR, the server’s private key sk and a reader R, it outputs
a secret rsk and the reader’s period key rpk. rpk is given to the reader and
rsk is given to the server. For each run of this algorithm, the reader’s current
keys are revoked.
– Auth(sk, PK, rsk, rpk) → {T,⊥}: The tag takes as input a private key sk
and a server’s public key PK, a reader takes as input a period key rpk and
the server takes as input a secret rsk, it outputs T if the tag is authenticated,
⊥ otherwise.
3 Proposed Protocols
The concrete constructions of proposed ARA protocols are presented in this
section. The protocol in Section 3.1 is based on symmetric key cryptography
and it achieves basic requirements of ARA protocols. Section 3.2 shows the
drawbacks of protocol 1 and describe an ECC-based solution which the server
handles most computations of the protocol execution. Optionally, Section 3.3
introduces a protocol which only requires constant communication cost during
the authentication and provides the false output detection. As an overview, Table
1 summarizes the security and privacy properties of three protocols along with
communication cost, computational efficiency and tag capabilities.
We define three cryptographic hash functions H1, H2, H3, where H1 : {0, 1}∗
→ {0, 1}l, H2 : {0, 1}∗ → Z∗p, H3 : {0, 1}∗ → G and employ the pairing group
(g, h, p, ê,G,GT ). G and GT are two multiplicative cyclic groups of the same
prime order p. g, h are two generators of group G. The map ê : G×G→ GT is
a symmetric bilinear mapping.
Forward Backward Reader Tag Unfo- Constant Constant Tag
Privacy Privacy Privacy rgeability Com. Cost Reader Auth. Cap.
P1  
√
× ×
√
H
P2
√ √ √ √
×
√
H,PK
P3
√ √ √ √ √
× H,PK
Table 1: Comparison of proposed protocols and tag capabilities.
√
: the protocol
achieves this property; ×: the protocol cannot provide this property; : the protocol
achieves this property without tag corruption operations; H: requires hash compu-
tations; PK: requires ECC computations. Note that tag unforgeability is against a
malicious server who cannot corrupt tags.
3.1 Protocol 1
Our proposed protocol 1 is based on the symmetric key cryptography. It only
requires a tag to compute hash values. The protocol achieves basic privacy re-
quirements of ARA protocols with a relaxed condition. We analyze the privacy
in Appendix A. The protocol is presented in Fig. 1.
– ServerKeyGen: The server generates a key space K.
– TagKeyGen: The member randomly chooses x ∈ K and sets (pk, sk) = (·, x).
The secret key sk is stored in the tag and given to the server.
– ReaderAuth: To authorize the reader R to identify a specified set of tags TR,
the server randomly chooses γ ∈ {0, 1}l, and sets (rpk, rsk) = (γ, γ).
– Auth:To authenticate a tag, the tag, reader and server interact as follows
1. The reader randomly chooses s ∈ {0, 1}l and send (s, γ) to the tag.
2. Upon receiving (s, γ), the tag selects a ∈ {0, 1}l and sends the reader
the response (a,C), where C = H1(x, a, s, γ).
3. Upon receiving the tag’s response C, the reader sends (a, s) to the server.
4. Upon receiving (a, s), the server retrieves (TR, γ). For each Ti ∈ TR,
the server computes C ′ = H1(xi, a, s, γ) then sends the reader a set
{(Ti, C ′i) : Ti ∈ TR}.
5. Finally, the reader outputs Ti if C ∈ {(Ti, C ′i) : Ti ∈ TR}. Details are
depicted as in Fig.1.
Tag T Reader R Server S
(x) (TR, γ) (R, γ, {(xi, Ti) : Ti ∈ TR})
s,γ←−−−−−−− s ∈ {0, 1}l
a ∈ {0, 1}l
C = H1(x, a, s, γ)
a,C−−−−−−−→
a,s−−−−−−−−−−−−→∀Ti ∈ TR, computes
C′i = H1(xi, a, s, γ)
Outputs Ti if
{(Ti,C
′
i):Ti∈TR}←−−−−−−−−−−−−
C ∈ {(Ti, C′i) : Ti ∈ TR}
Fig. 1: Authorized RFID authentication protocol 1.
3.2 Protocol 2
In ARA system model, tag, reader and server are relatively independent. The
key of a tag is expected to be unknown by the server since the server could abuse
the key to forge the tag. It is difficult to prevent forging a tag by the server from
using symmetric key based protocols. A trivial solution may be that the tag
sends a signed nonce to the reader. However, in this case, the tag’s response is
publicly verifiable that an adversary can identify the tag by exhaustive public
key search. Thus, tag’s identity needs to be concealed and only an authorized
reader is entitled to reveal. We then present Protocol 2 with ECC to tackle this
issue. The protocol is presented in Fig.2.
– ServerKeyGen: The server randomly picks α ∈ Z∗p, and sets the public/private
key pair (PK,SK) = (gα, α).
– TagKeyGen: The member randomly chooses x ∈ Z∗p, and computes the tag’s
public and private keys (pk, sk) = (gx, x). (g, sk, pk, PK) are stored in the
tag and pk is given to the server.
– ReaderAuth: To authorize the reader R to identify a specified set of tags
TR, the server randomly chooses γ ∈ Z∗p, and sets the reader’s period
rpk = {γ, (Ti, gxi) : Ti ∈ TR} and secret key rsk = (γ, α). The server
stores (R, rsk,TR) and sends rpk to the reader R.
– Auth: To authenticate a tag, the tag, reader and server communicate as
follows.
1. The reader randomly selects B ∈ G and sends (B, γ) to the tag.
2. Upon receiving (B, γ) from the reader, the tag randomly chooses r ∈ Z∗p,
and computes (w, s, C1, C2, C3). It sends (C1, C2, C3) as the response to
the reader. Note that C1 is to assist reader identify a tag and hide the
value s, otherwise the tag’s response is publicly verifiable.
3. Upon receiving (C1, C2, C3), the reader forwards (B,C3) to the server.
4. Upon receiving the message (B,C3) from the reader R, for each Ti ∈ TR,
the server computes (w′, Vi, Ui). Then the server replies {(Ti, Vi, Ui) :
Ti ∈ TR}.
5. Finally, the reader outputs Ti if C1 = Ui and ê(C2, g
xi+Vi) = ê(g, g),
otherwise rejects.
Tag T Reader R Server S
(g, x, gx, gα) ({γ, (Ti, gxi ) : Ti ∈ TR}) (γ, α,TR, {gxi})
B,γ←−−−−−−− B ∈ G
r ∈ Z∗p
w = H2(g
αr)
s = H2(w, g
x, B, γ)
C1 = H2(s)
C2 = g
1
x+s
C3 = g
r C1,C2,C3−−−−−−−→
(B,C1, C2, C3)
B,C3−−−−−−−−−−−−→ If Ti ∈ TR, computes
w′ = H2(C
α
3 )
Vi = H2(w
′, gxi , B, γ)
Outputs Ti if
{(Ti,Vi,Ui):Ti∈TR}←−−−−−−−−−−−− Ui = H2(Vi)
C1=Ui and
ê
(
C2, g
xi+Vi
)
= ê (g, g)
Fig. 2: Authorized RFID authentication protocol 2.
3.3 Protocol 3
ARA protocol 2 engages the reader to perform constant computations during
the tag authentication. Instead, the server needs to send the reader a set of
possible values for tag identification. In some scenarios where the communication
bandwith is limited, it is desired to reduce the size of the set. Hence, we introduce
third protocol which only transfers one group element from the server to the
reader. Additionally, we consider a new attack that the server may cheat a reader
by replying a random value which is called false output. Then, the reader could
not successfully authenticate a tag even the tag is valid. This attack cannot be
detected in neither protocol 1 nor protocol 2. Fortunately, our protocol 3 below
shows that it is able to determine whether the received value is a false output.
The protocol is depicted as in Fig.3
– ServerKeyGen: The server picks α, where α ∈ Z∗p, and sets the public key
PK = hα and the private key SK = α.
– TagKeyGen: The member randomly chooses x ∈ Z∗p and computes the tag’s
public and private keys (pk, sk) = (hx, gx). (g, sk, PK) are stored in the tag
and pk is given to the server.
– ReaderAuth: To authorize the reader R to identify a specified set of tags TR,
the server randomly chooses a secret γ ∈ Z∗p, and computes gγ . For each
tag Ti ∈ TR, the server computes (hxi)αγ and sets the reader’s period key
rpk = {gγ , (Ti, hαxiγ) : Ti ∈ TR} and the secret rsk = (γ, α). The server
stores (R, rsk,TR) and sends rpk to the reader R.
– Auth: To authenticate a tag, the following steps are implemented.
1. The reader randomly selects B ∈ G and sends (B, gγ) to the tag.
2. Upon receiving (B, gγ) from the reader, the tag chooses two random
numbers r, s ∈ Z∗p, and computes a tuple (C1, C2, C3, C4, C5). It sends
the tuple to the reader as a response.
3. Upon receiving the response, the reader checks ê(C2, C4)
?
= ê(g,A). If it
holds, the reader forwards (B,C3, C4, C5) to the server.
4. Upon receiving the message (B,C3, C4, C5) from the reader R, the server
retrieves (γ, gγ) and check ê(C3, A
′)
?
= ê(hα, C5). If it holds, the server
calculates and sends V = Cγ3 to the reader.
5. Finally, the reader authenticate the tag according to the server’s re-
sponse. Firstly, the checks the equation ê(V, g)
?
= ê(C3, g
γ). If the equa-
tion does not hold, the reader outputs false. After that, the reader com-
putes ê(V,C1) and checks whether there exists a pair (Ti, h
αxiγ) ∈ rpk,
such that ê (V,C1) = ê (h
αxiγ , C2). The reader outputs Ti if the above
equation holds, otherwise rejects.
Tag T Reader R Server S
(gx, hα) ({gγ , (Ti, hαxiγ) : Ti ∈ TR}) (hα, γ, gγ)
B,gγ←−−−−− B ∈ G
r, s ∈ Z∗p
C1 = g
xrs
C2 = g
r, C3 = h
α
s
C4 = H3(B, g
γ , C1, C3)
1
r
C5 = H3(B, g
γ , C4, C3)
1
s
C1,··· ,C5−−−−−→
A = H3(B, g
γ , C1, C3)
ê(C2, C4)
?
= ê(g,A)
B,C3,C4,C5−−−−−−−−→A′ = H3(B, gγ , C4, C3)
ê(C3, A
′)
?
= ê(hα, C5)
V = Cγ3
ê(V, g)
?
= ê(C3, g
γ)
V←−−−−−−−−
ê (V,C1)
?
= ê (hαxiγ , C2)
Fig. 3: Authorized RFID authentication Protocol 3.
3.4 Efficiency
We compare the efficiency in Table 2. In Protocol 2, C1 is used for the reader
to quickly identify the tag, and C2 is for identity verification. The main com-
putational cost of reader is dominated by computing gH2(Vi,B) and ê(C2, g
xi ·
gH2(Vi,B)) for the verification, where ê(g, g) can be pre-computed. This protocol
requires the server to compute all potential hash values for the reader. The com-
munication cost therefore is all Vi for each tag in TR. The server can send all
hash values in sequences to eliminate sending Ti. In protocol 3, the communica-
tion cost and the computational cost of server is constant-size and independent
of the size of TR. The price to pay of this protocol is a liner computation cost on
the reader. The reader needs to identify the potential tag one by one until the
correct one is found. The computation time therefore is linear in n for |TR| = n.
Note that Protocol 2 is suitable for computationally weak readers without
bandwidth limitation, while Protocol 3 fits for scenarios of limited bandwidth.
Reader Computation Communication Server Computation
Protocols Cost Cost Cost
Protocol 2 G+ê nZp G + 2nH2
Protocol 3 (n + 1)ê G G + ê
Table 2: Efficiency of two Protocols. Here, we assume the reader can identify n tags
(i.e., |TR| = n).
4 Privacy and Security Models
In this section, we consider the privacy and security models of authorized au-
thentication protocols. We assume that the communication channel between the
reader and the server is secure.
4.1 Adversaries and Oracles
We define a set of oracles and four attacks which respectively aim at different
goals. In the particular attack, the ability of an adversary is regarded as the
actions executed by oracle calls.
Definition 1 (Oracles). The adversary plays with the challenger by given pub-
lic information of the system and the following oracles.
– TagCorrupt(T )→ sk: On input a tag T , it outputs the tag’s private key sk.
– ReaderAuth(TR) → rpk: On input a set of tags TR, it outputs the reader’s
period key rpk.
– SendTag(T,m, π)→ m′: On input a tag T , a message m and a session π, it
sends the message m to the tag and receives the tag’s response m′.
– SendServer(m)→ m′: On input a message m, it sends the message m to the
server and receives the response m′.
– Challenge(m∗, T ∗)→ C∗: On input a message m∗ and a target tag T ∗ which
is not issued to ReaderAuth oracle, it flips a coin b and outputs a response
C∗ regarding to the tag T ∗ (if b = 1) or a random tag T ∗′ (if b = 0). This
oracle can be called at most once of a game.
Definition 2 (Strong and weak adversaries). We define four types of at-
tacks as follows.
– Forward attack: The adversary plays as a malicious reader who attempts to
trace the tags’ previous communications after it has been authorized by the
server.
– Backward attack: The adversary plays as a malicious reader who attempts to
trace the tags’ future communications after it has been revoked by the server.
– Outside attack: The adversary plays as a dishonest server who attempts to
discover the tag which is authenticating by the reader.
– Impersonation attack: The adversary plays as an impersonator who is not the
tag holder attempts to impersonate the tag which is not compromised without
being detected.
A strong adversary can access all above oracles and launch all above attacks.
A weak adversary cannot access the TagCorrypt(·) oracle and can only run the
forward and backward attacks.
4.2 Privacy and Security Models
Forward Privacy. The forward privacy game allows the adversary A to launch
the forward attack. In the ARA system, a reader R may be authorized to au-
thenticate a tag T in a certain period P of time. However, R shall not be able
to interpret T ’s sessions prior to P since R is unauthorized to authenticate T
outside the time P . In the forward privacy game, A is given the reader’s current
period key and attempts to decide whether the tag which can be authenticated
currently was involved in the previous interactions.
The forward privacy game is defines in two phases, which are Forward Phase
and Backward Phase. A plays with the challenger as follows.
– Setup: The challenger runs the algorithms ServerKeyGen and TagKeyGen to
generate the server and tags’ public/private keys (PK,SK) and {(pki, ski)},
respectively. The challenger gives public keys to A.
– Forward Phase: The challenger sets the reader’s period key and A can query
Challenge(·) for the challenge. A interacts with the challenger through the
oracles which can be accessed by the classified type of A.
– Backward Phase: The challenger refreshes the reader’s period key and A
interacts with the challenger through the oracles which can be accessed by
the classified type of A.
– Guess: A outputs a bit b′ and wins the game if b′ = b.
Definition 3. An authorized authentication scheme provides forward privacy if
there is no A who wins the above game with the probability Pr[b′ = b] ≥ 12 + ε,
where ε is negligible.
Backward Privacy. The backward privacy game allows the adversary A to
launch the backward attack. It is different from the forward attack that a reader
R attempts to trace the tag after R has been revoked. In the backward privacy
game, A is given the reader’s current period key to authenticate the tags, while
A needs to decide whether a tag involves in the future interactions after the
reader was revoked.
The backward privacy game is defined in two phases, which are Forward Phase
and Backward Phase. A plays with the challenger as follows.
– Setup: The challenger runs the algorithms ServerKeyGen and TagKeyGen to
generate the server and tags’ public/private keys (PK,SK) and {(pki, ski)},
respectively. The challenger gives public keys to A.
– Forward Phase: The challenger sets the reader’s period key and A interacts
with the challenger through the oracles which can be accessed by the classi-
fied type of A.
– Backward Phase: The challenger refreshes the reader’s period key and A can
query Challenge(·) for the challenge. A interacts with the challenger through
the oracles which can be accessed by the classified type of A.
– Guess: AF outputs a bit b′ and wins the game if b′ = b.
Definition 4. An authorized authentication scheme provides backward unlinka-
bility if there is no A who wins the above game with the probability Pr[b′ = b] ≥
1
2 + ε, where ε is negligible.
Reader Privacy. The reader privacy game allows the adversary A to launch the
outside attack. Conventionally, the reader and the server are mutually trusted
in RFID systems. However, the reader’s privacy is needed to be considered in
ARA protocols. For instance, the server may intend to learn the identity of
the tag which is authenticating by the reader. Since the reader and the server
are operated by different parties, the reader/tag interaction should be invisible
to the server. In the reader privacy game, A is given the secret of the server
and attempts to distinguish the tags during the server/reader interactions. A
interacts with the challenger as follows.
– Setup: The challenger runs the algorithms ServerKeyGen, TagKeyGen and
ReaderAuth to respectively generate the server’s public and private keys
(PK,SK), tag’s public and private keys (pk, sk) and reader’s period keys
(rpk, rsk). The challenger gives the server and tags’ public/private keys and
the reader’s period keys to A.
– Query: The adversary is allowed to make queries to the oracle SendServer(·).
– Challenge: The adversary outputs two tags T0 and T1 to the challenger.
The challenger randomly chooses a bit b ∈ {0, 1}. Let Mt be the output
of SendTag(·) with respect to the tag Tb and Ms be the corresponding query
to SendServer(·). The challenger sends Ms to the adversary.
– Guess: A outputs a bit b′ and wins the game if b′ = b.
Definition 5. An authorized authentication scheme provides reader privacy if
there is no A who wins the above game with the probability Pr[b′ = b] ≥ 12 + ε,
where ε is negligible. We say that it unconditionally preserves the reader privacy
if ε = 0.
Tag Unforgeability. The tag unforgeability is with respect to the security of
the protocol and the attacker is referred to a malicious sever. This game allows
an adversary A to launch the impersonation attack. Clearly, it is hard to prevent
the impersonation attack if the tag is corrupted. Symmetry-key based protocols
are not secure against this attack as a server obtains secret keys of tags during the
system setup. Hence, TagCorrupt(·) oracle cannot be queried during the game.
A attempts to forge a tag’s response to pass the authentication. It allows A to
access the secret of the server and the reader. A interacts with the challenger as
follows.
– Setup: The challenger runs the algorithms ServerKeyGen, TagKeyGen and
ReaderAuth to respectively generate the server’s public and private keys
(PK,SK), tag’s public and private keys (pk, sk) and reader’s period keys
(rpk, rsk). The challenger gives the server’s private key, tags’ public key and
reader’s period keys to A.
– Query: The adversary can query the oracle SendTag(·) to the challenger.
– Forgery: A outputs a valid session π which is not queried to the SendTag(·)
oracle.
Definition 6. An authorized authentication scheme provides tag unforgeability
if there is no A who can outputs a valid forgery of the tag with the non-negligible
advantage ε.
5 Privacy and Security Analysis
To analyze the privacy and security of protocols, we define two new complexity
assumptions which are given in Appendix A. Due to the page limitation, we refer
the readers to the full version of this paper for the proof of theorems3.
Theorem 1. Our ARA protocol 1 provides forward privacy and backward pri-
vacy against the weak adversary if H1 is pre-image resistant and provides un-
conditional reader privacy.
Theorem 2. Our ARA protocl 2 provides forward privacy and backward privacy
against the strong adversary if the ODH assumption holds, tag unforgeability if
BB signature [3] is secure and unconditional reader privacy.
Theorem 3. Our ARA protocol 3 provides forward privacy and backward pri-
vacy against the strong adversary if the V-l-wDBDHI assumption holds, reader
privacy if the EDBDH assumption holds and tag unforgeability if k+1-Exponent
assumption holds.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we introduced a novel concept of authorized RFID authentication
protocols. The reader’s privacy is considered as a new issue that it prevents the
server disclosing the identity of the tag which is authenticated by the reader. Two
protocols were proposed based on the different efficiency requirements. We pro-
vided the formal definition of privacy and security models of authorized authen-
tication protocols and proved that our protocols are secure against the various
adversaries.
3 The full version of the paper can be requested from the authors.
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A Complexity Assumptions
Definition 7 (Oracle Diffie-Hellman Assumption [1]). Given ga, gb, a
function H : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}l and an oracle O = H(bX), where X 6= ga,
the advantage of an adversary A in violating the ODH assumption is
AdvodhA,H =
∣∣Pr [a, b : AO(ga, gb, H(gab)) = 1]− Pr [a, b : AO(ga, gb, t) = 1]∣∣ ,
where t ∈ {0, 1}l We say that the ODH assumption holds, if AdvodhA,H is negligible.
Definition 8 (EDBDH Assumption). Let (g, p,G,GT ) be a pairing group.
Given (g, ga, gb, gc, gt), the Extended Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman problem
is to determine whether gt = gabc. We say that the EDBDH assumption holds,
if no PPT algorithm A can solve the problem with non-negligible advantage.
Definition 9 (V-l-wDBDHI Assumption). Let (g, h, p,G,GT ) be a pair-
ing group. Given (g, h, ga, ga
2
, · · · , gal , ha, ha2 , · · · , hal , gt), the Various l-weak
Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Inversion problem is to determine whether
gt = ga
2l+1
. We say that the V-l-wDBDHI assumption holds, if no PPT algo-
rithm A can solve the problem with non-negligible advantage.
Definition 10 (k+1-Exponent assumption). Given (g, ga, ga
2
, · · · , gak), the
k+1-Exponent problem is to compute ga
k+1
. We say that the k+1-Exponent as-
sumption holds, if no PPT algorithm A can solve the problem with non-negligible
advantage.
We show that the security of EDBDH assumption is related to the security
of Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (DBDH) assumption.
Lemma 1. The EDBDH assumption holds if the DBDH assumption holds.
Proof. Suppose that there is a PPT algorithm A who can break the EDBDH
assumption. Given an instance (g, ga, gb, gc, gt), A can output whether gt = gabc
in polynomial time with non-negligible advantage. It implies that A decides
whether ê(g, gt) = ê(g, gabc) which is a solution of DBDH problem. Therefore, if
DBDH problem is intractable then the EDBDH assumption holds. 2
To analyse the security of V-l-wDBDHI assumption, we show that its security
is similar to the security of l-weak Decisional Bilinear Deffie-Hellman Inversion (l-
wDBDHI) assumption. According Lemma 1, a solution of V-l-wDBDHI problem
also implies that the algorithmA can decide whether ê(g, gt) = ê(g, ga2l+1). Since
that l-wDBDHI is proved secure in the generic group model, the complexity of V-
l-wDBDHI can be bounded by using the similar proof of general Diffie-Hellman
Exponent problem [4].
